Reasoning
is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better
decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to
epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the
function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the
function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate
arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given
the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their
vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the
psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and
better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in
standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative
context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative
setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers,
however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their
views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is
apparent not only when people are actually arguing but also when they
are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their
opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes
and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also
favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In
all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws,
reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device:
Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris
paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
link http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090
link http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090